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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 06/04/2006

Accident number: 297

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 22/05/2000

Where it occurred: Cordon Sanitaire,
Mozambique border

Country: Zimbabwe

Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Other

Date of main report: 06/05/2000

ID original source: JM

Name of source: Mounser/AVS
2001:Z04

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast

Ground condition: woodland (bush)

Date record created: 19/02/2004

Date last modified: 19/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
mechanical follow-up (?)

Accident report
The following official “accident summary” was made available in January 2001. No other
report was made. The summary was compiled by the demining group’s site manager.
The following text has only been edited where necessary to conceal the identity of individuals
and organisations mentioned.
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On 22 April 2000, the Deminer was conducting clearance activities in the CS [Cordon
Sanitaire] along the first row mines. As he was working an R2M2 approximately 2m in front of
him detonated without any external influences.
At the time of the accident the Crew Supervisor called a casevac, thinking a deminer had
detonated a mine. Immediately after the casevac call the Supervisor further reported that it
was a false alarm, that nobody was injured. [The victim] then provided the details of the
accident.
The deminer sustained no injuries from the mine blast, being protected by his PPE. He was
attended to by the Crew Paramedic who confirmed that no injuries were sustained. The
deminer returned to work immediately after the medical check.
Two days after the accident the deminer complained of hearing hypersensitivity, where each
time a controlled explosion took place, his ears would become painful. The project Doctor
conducted an investigation of the individual’s hearing and identified that the deminer indeed
suffered from hypersensitivity. The Doctor compiled a referral letter for [the victim] to see an
ear specialist to determine the damage sustained. The Doctor’s initial opinion is that full
hearing will be restored.
[The specialist] to whom [the victim] had been referred, recommended 1 month sick leave to
allow his ears to heal. The documentation for the special appointment is held by [the
company] and the [field Doctor] has not been able to obtain this information. [The victim]
returned to work on Wednesday 03 May 00, stating he was fit enough to work.
No on site examination was conducted, as the casevac call had been relayed through as a
false alarm. However, a discussion was held at the Field Operations Base to identify why the
mine had detonated. From the explanations taken from personnel on site there is no physical
reason for the mine to detonate other than a suspicion that this could have been induced by
the steel wheels of the ground preparation tractor.
On 30th March 2000 a similar accident occurred approximately 90 metres from where this
mine detonated. Again the mine detonated without any external influences.
The only measure to be emphasised is the wearing of PPE each time personnel enter the
minefield or are to work near mines.
Signed: Operations Manager

Victim Report
Victim number: 377

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not applicable

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Hearing
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.
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Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is classed as “Unavoidable” because the victim appears to
have been working properly and fallen victim to a spontaneous detonation.
However, it was known by this time that the mechanical preparation on the site left mines
exposed and in a dangerous condition (see Related Papers). The secondary cause is listed
as “Inadequate equipment”. Management revised demolition procedures because of a
perceived increased risk, but apparently did not reconsider the manner in which the machines
were deployed. This may be seen as a “Management/control inadequacy”.
The accident investigation is considered inadequate because no record of a full investigation
was found.
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Related papers
In an exchange with one of the Field Supervisors at the site, the researcher asked the
following:
Q) It seems that several accidents involved spontaneous detonations of R2M2s after
machines had worked in the area. Is this so?
A) True the R2M2 had a strange habit of detonating without anything directly appearing to
cause the mine to function. This did usually occur after a machine had been in the vicinity.
Remember that we (the mechanical unit) were operating in advance of the manual follow up
using bush-cutting equipment, bulldozers and the MineBuster excavator. I witnessed mines
detonating without external influence personally – one went off 35m from my vehicle as I was
travelling up the safety road.
This happened only in the R2M2 areas and I suspect that the plastic assembly of the fuse
housing was damaged (the plastic distorted) and although the metallic balls of the safety
release had released, the distortion of the plastic prevented the firing spring from creeping
forward and initiating the mine. When the heat of the day expanded the plastic, the spring was
released and the pin forced into the stab-detonator.
The thought of moving R2M2 mines in this condition - putting them into a pit to be destroyed
(max 10 in a pit) – was unacceptable. So R2M2s found in areas after the machines had
worked were burned in-situ. Other mines were still destroyed in pits.
The burning was carried out under an SOP that was drawn up for the procedure and
approved by the QA. Basically the mine was marked (nobody worked past a mine on the
surface) and when the deminer's forward progress was blocked, the Team Leader would burn
the mines (Safety distance 50m min). He would place a firelighter up-wind of the mine and
adjacent to it. He would wear full PPE and be careful not to touch or disturb the mine. He
would proceed to burn the entire line of mines working into the wind. The average time from
burning initiation to completion was 12 minutes. The minimum wait time was set at 15 minutes
before the mines were approached (in PPE) and the residue was checked. Only one working
box was burned at a time. In the dry season, a line of dried grass placed adjacent to the fire
lighters was used as an extended safety measure. This method was used extensively without
accident.
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